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maintained, are in fact and in law private property; having all the incidents of property of that nature. I am also of the opinion, that the several acts of Assembly, passed concurrently by the Legislatures of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, for the protection of the owners of the said fisheries against interruption or injury, by persons claiming a common right of fishing in the said river, are constitutional and in all respects valid.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the District Court of the United States for the Wisconsin District.

ENOCH W. CLARKE AND OTHERS *vs.* THE CITY OF JANESVILLE.

1. Coupons or interest warrants attached to bonds of a city, issued to a railroad company, for stock, by the city subscribed for, in pursuance of a local law, are not original obligations or promises to pay the bearer, and have no legal validity independently of the bond.
2. The assignee of such bonds cannot maintain a suit in his own name, there being no law in the State authorizing it.
3. Such bonds do not, by assignment to bearer, assume the character of negotiable paper, for the purpose of suit by the bearer.
4. The federal courts are excluded from jurisdiction of suits upon such bonds, issued to a corporation or citizen of the same State of the obligor, by Sect. 11 of the Act of Congress to establish the judicial courts of the United States. 1 Statutes at Large, 73.

The issue joined in this cause came on to be tried. The declaration was in assumpsit upon the common counts; to which the general issue was pleaded. In support of the issue on the part of the plaintiffs, were offered in evidence several bonds of the city of Janesville, to the Rock River Valley Union Railroad Company, with coupons or interest warrants annexed. The bonds were issued in the year 1853, for one thousand dollars each, payable in twenty years, with interest at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, at the city of New York. They were signed by

the mayor of the city, with the seal of the city annexed, and were countersigned by the Treasurer of the city. They are payable to the said railroad company or assigns; and on the day of their date, they purport to have been assigned by the President of said company to _____ or bearer. Printed on the same sheet of paper, with each bond, are forty coupons or interest warrants, each for forty dollars, for a semi-annual interest, according to the condition of the bond. These coupons are signed by the Treasurer of the city, and are made payable to the bearer; in regular succession of every six months, for twenty years. This suit is to recover the interest that had accrued on the bonds since their date; and it is in assumpsit upon the coupons for such interest.

To this evidence the defendant's counsel objected, for several reasons; of which the following are here noticed:

1. These coupons or interest warrants have no legal validity independently of the bonds, to which they are annexed, and they pass to the assignee of said bonds.

2. There is no law in this State, empowering an assignee of a bond or specialty to maintain a suit in his own name.

3. This court has no jurisdiction of this cause; the jurisdiction being excluded by sect. 11 of the act of Congress to establish the judicial courts of the United States, approved September 24th, 1789. 1 Statutes at Large, 73.

These bonds were issued in pursuance of an act of the Legislature of Wisconsin, entitled "An Act to Incorporate the city of Janesville, approved March 19th, 1853. By sect. 7 of said act, "the Common Council shall have power to submit to the legal voters, the question, whether said city shall take stock in any railroad running to, or passing through said city. And if a majority of the votes cast on any such question be in favor of taking stock, then the Common Council shall, by resolution to be entered on the city records, authorize the mayor to subscribe for the city the amount of stock voted to be taken." And by sect. 9, "the Common Council shall have power to issue the bonds of the city, with coupons or interest warrants attached, drawing not more than ten per cent. interest, to pay the stock so subscribed, and shall have

power to levy a special tax on the taxable property in said city, to pay the interest on such bonds, and also the principal, when the same becomes due. But the Common Council shall not have power to dispose of such bonds for less than the face thereof."

The Rock River Valley Union Railroad Company, and the city of Janesville, are corporations created by the laws of Wisconsin; and they are located and doing business in said State.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MILLER, J.—The clause of the eleventh section of the Judiciary Act, in regard to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, is this: "Nor shall any District or Circuit Court have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of a promissory note or chose in action, in favor of any assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents, if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange." This section is restrictive of the jurisdiction contemplated by the third article of the Constitution of the United States, which provides, that the judicial power shall extend to controversies between citizens of different States. The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States, but has not prescribed how much of it shall be exercised by the Circuit or District Courts. These courts were created by statute, in pursuance of the Constitution, and can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers. *Sheldon vs. Sill*, 8 Howard, 441. It is well understood, by those experienced in the jurisprudence of the United States, that Congress has conferred upon the federal courts but a portion of the jurisdiction contemplated by the Constitution. This prohibition was inserted in the law, for the purpose of relieving the federal courts, as much as possible, from enforcing local contracts; and also of preventing assignments of choses in action to non-residents, for the purpose of rendering a defence upon the merits or a set-off less available to defendants.

A suit might be sustained in this court, by the plaintiffs against the defendant, to recover possession of these bonds in specie, or damages for their wrongful caption or detention; for this law has

no application to such a suit by the assignee of a chose in action, but only to a suit or action to recover the contents. *Deshler vs. Dodge*, 16 Howard, 622. So in *Smith vs. Kernochen*, 7 Id. 198, an assignee of a mortgage between parties of the same State, maintained ejectment against the mortgagor to recover possession of the mortgaged premises.

In *Sheldon vs. Sill*, 8 Howard, 441, it is decided that a bond for a debt with a mortgage to secure it, is a chose in action; and that the assignee of a mortgage between citizens of the same State cannot maintain a bill in chancery to foreclose, when the mortgagee cannot, because it is a suit to recover the contents of a chose in action. Nor have the federal courts cognizance of a suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such courts to recover the said contents, if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange. *Gibson vs. Chew*, 16 Peters, 315; *Dromgoole vs. The Farmers and Mechanics Bank*, 2 Howard, 241. In these and many other cases, this restrictive clause has been liberally construed.

It is contended, that these bonds were intended for negotiation, as promissory notes, and that they were so put in circulation by the assignment. In pursuance of the act of incorporation of the city of Janesville, these bonds were given to the railroad company in payment of stock in said company, subscribed for by the city. The law did not require the railroad company to accept these bonds in payment of the stock; nor did it authorize them to be given to any particular person or corporation, or to be put in circulation as negotiable paper. The bonds might either be given to any person or corporation, who would furnish their amount at par, as a loan to the city or to the railroad company in payment of the stock. The act prohibited the Common Council from disposing of them for less than their face; thereby placing the city of Janesville, as a stockholder, by means of these bonds on an equality with the other stockholders who paid in cash. And whether the assignment of the bonds is equitable or legal, the effect thereof as to the assignee, in regard of the jurisdiction of the court, is the same. See the opinion

of Marshall, Chief Justice, in *Sere vs. Pitot*, 6 Cranch, 332. The assignment of these bonds is not to the plaintiffs by name, but to ——— or bearer, leaving the space for their or any other names to be inserted. This may be proper in a financial point of view, to save the necessity of a formal assignment at each transfer. But these bonds are made to the railroad company or its assigns; and an assignment is necessary to pass them. The railroad company, being a corporation created by the laws of this State, and located and doing business therein, cannot maintain a suit upon these bonds to recover their contents or the interest accrued on them, either in its own name or in that of an assignee.

When the plaintiff has a legal right to sue, the court will not inquire into the residence of those who may have an equitable interest in the demand, as in *Bonnafee vs. Williams*, 3 Howard, 574, where it is decided that the court has jurisdiction where a note is made by a citizen of one State, and payable to another citizen of the same State or bearer, and the party bringing the suit is a citizen of a different State, although upon the face of the note it was expressed to be for the use of persons residing in the State, in which the maker and payee lived. But in its inception, a bond should be made payable to some certain obligee, and cannot be made payable like a note or bill to bearer. *Ann. Dig.* for 1851, page 79, sec. 63. And the legal right to recover on a bond is in the obligee. *Irish vs. Johnston*, 1 Jones' Rep. 483. These bonds are under the seal of the corporation of the city, and are specialties, and are not negotiable as bills of exchange and promissory notes, either by the law merchant or by statute. All interest in them, either legal or equitable, must pass from the obligee by assignment or endorsement. By the assignment of these bonds, the plaintiffs may have acquired an interest in them sufficient to control them, and to receive their contents, but they cannot sue in their own names. There is no statute authority in this State for the assignment or transfer of a bond or specialty, whereby the assignee or holder may become the legal owner, and be enabled to sue in his own name. The law authorizing the execution and delivery of these bonds, and the consideration expressed show the railroad company to be the legal obligee,

which can be the only plaintiff in a suit upon them, either for principal or interest, in the absence of a law enabling an assignee to become a legal party. In the case of *Irvine vs. Lowry*, 14 Peters, 293, the note in suit was made by Lowry, payable to Irvine or order, in the notes of the Lumbermen's Bank, and was endorsed to the bank. The Supreme Court in the opinion say, "The paper is not negotiable by the usage or custom of merchants. The promise is not to pay any certain sum of money, but the amount in the notes of the Lumbermen's Bank. It is not a promissory note either by the law merchant or by the statute, and not being under seal, it is not assignable by the Act of Assembly of Pennsylvania on that subject relating to bonds. The bank, therefore, cannot sue in its own name, by virtue of the endorsement of Irvine; nor could they sue if it was a specialty endorsed to them, because the legal right of action would still remain in Irvine, though the equitable interest in the thing promised may have passed to the bank." So it is in this case, in the absence of a statute providing for an assignment of bonds, and for the assignee maintaining suit in his own name. The legal right of action remains in the Railroad Company, the obligee, though the equitable interest in the contents of the bonds may have passed to the plaintiffs.

It may be said, that, although these obligations have been issued by a corporation having a seal, and which is thereto annexed, they should be considered as negotiable choses in action. But it is now well understood, that corporations can issue promises in writing to pay money, and can contract debts without the use of their seal. The coupons call these papers certificates; but the law, authorizing the counsel to issue them, terms them bonds, and on their face they have the form of bonds. But let them be technically bonds or not, they can only be transferred by assignment.

This suit is in assumpsit upon those coupons, which specify the semi-annual interest payable before the date of the summons. The plaintiffs have proceeded upon them as promissory notes or negotiable paper, payable to bearer; and they contend that the law re-

strictive of our jurisdiction is not applicable to them. It is well settled, that this provision of law does not extend to notes payable to bearer; upon the ground, that the original promise is to pay any person, who may happen to be the bearer; and that as the interest in such a note passes by mere manual delivery, the holder cannot, therefore, be said to claim by virtue of an assignment, and is not affected by the disabilities of the nominal payee. *Bullard vs. Bell*, 1 Mason, 251; *The Bank of Kentucky vs. Wistar*, 2 Peters, 318. But is the original promise or obligation of the city of Janesville in these coupons? The charter of the city authorized the Common Council to issue bonds, with coupons or interest warrants annexed. In pursuance of that law, and a resolution of the Common Council, bonds were executed by the Mayor as the head and president of the Council and corporation, under the corporate seal, for one thousand dollars each, payable in twenty years, with interest at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually at the city of New York, with forty coupons or interest warrants attached to each bond, representing the interest condition of the bond.

The bonds are signed by the mayor and countersigned by the treasurer of the city. The coupons or interest warrants are signed by the treasurer alone; and they do not purport to be obligations of the city through the Common Council, but have a direct reference to the bond to which it is attached. There is no question, that by the face of the bonds, in connection with the coupons, the interest is recoverable semi-annually, as it becomes payable. The coupons are appendages to the bonds for convenience in receipting for interest paid, and also as evidence to the purchaser of the bonds of the non-payment of any previous interest; and they pass by assignment of the bond to which they are attached. They had no legal force or validity at their inception, independently of the bonds; and it is upon the bonds alone that the interest is recoverable. They draw the attention of the court directly to the bond, to which they are attached, as the original contract. The bonds are special contracts of a city, in pursuance of a local law, for a

local and specified purpose, which the court must disregard in pronouncing the coupons negotiable paper, payable to anybody, and recoverable by the holder.

For these reasons, the evidence is rejected and the suit dismissed.

Mr. Brown, for the plaintiff.

Mr. Noggle, for the defendant.

In the Supreme Court of California.

EX PARTE FRANK KNOWLES.

1. The power to naturalize is made a judicial power by the Act of Congress.
2. Congress cannot confer any judicial power upon a State court.
3. The provision of the Constitution of the United States, which gives Congress the power to establish "An uniform rule of naturalization," is construed to mean—that the rule when established shall be executed by the States.
4. The Legislature of California has, by express enactment, conferred jurisdiction on the District Courts of the State to grant naturalization, according to the rules established by Congress.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HEYDENFELDT, J.—This is an application on the part of an alien to become naturalized under the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. It has been made directly to this court, and has been resisted by several eminent members of the bar, in the character of *amici curiæ*, on the ground that State courts have no jurisdiction of the subject matter.

It might be a sufficient answer to the applicant to declare what is the settled decision of this court,—that it is, under the State Constitution, an appellate tribunal, and can take no original jurisdiction, however conferred.

But the importance of the question which has been argued at the bar, and the learning and research which have been evinced in its examination, induce us, in departure from our usual habit, to consider and determine the proper construction which should be